International Commercial Law Series

First published at Uniserve Law, Australian National University, Canberra


Jurisdiction and ADR Clauses
John Levingston

Note: The High Court of Australia has now handed down its decision in the Akai Pty Ltd v The People's Insurance Company Limited case referred to in this article

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

FORUM NON CONVENIENS

EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION CLAUSES

PROPER LAW OF THE CONTRACT

DISCRETIONARY CONSIDERATIONS

EFFECT OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS ACT

REFERENCE TO ARBITRATION

INTRODUCTION

This paper is concerned with the question of forum non conveniens or appropriate forum in the context of exclusive jurisdiction and arbitration clauses by review of a number of recent decisions by judges in New South Wales, England and the United States.

FORUM NON CONVENIENS

The leading cases in Australia on forum non conveniens or appropriate forum are the decisions of the High Court of Australia in Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay 1 and Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd 2, and as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of NSW observed in Goliath Portland Cement Co Ltd v Bengtell 3:

Australian jurisprudence on the topic of forum non conveniens has developed upon somewhat distinctive lines; our law is different from that of England and different again from that which applies in the United States. The time may come when it is necessary for the High Court to develop a comprehensive set of principles to deal with all the issues that may arise where there are multiple defendants.

It is important to note that the High Court in Oceanic Sun declined to follow and apply the principles governing forum non conveniens determined by the English House of Lords in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd 4, see the judgment of Deane in Oceanic Sun 5:

A party who has regularly invoked the jurisdiction of a competent court has a prima facie right to insist upon its exercise and to have his claim heard and determined...In this country, [certain] special categories of case have not traditionally encompassed a general judicial discretion to dismiss or stay proceedings in a case within jurisdiction merely on the ground that the local court is persuaded that some tribunal in another country would be a more appropriate forum.

In the argument before the Court in Voth 6 the Court was asked to reconsider the decision in Oceanic Sun and to follow the English decision in Spiliada on the basis that there was no clear majority in Oceanic Sun. This approach also involved an attack on the much earlier decision of the High Court of Australia in Maritime Insurance Co Ltd v Geelong Harbour Trust Commissioners 7. In examining Oceanic Sun the majority in Voth 8 set out the common ground in that decision:

First, a plaintiff who has regularly invoked the jurisdiction of a court has a prima facie right to insist upon its exercise. Secondly, the traditional power to stay proceedings which have been regularly commenced, on appropriate forum grounds, is to be exercised in accordance with the general principle empowering a court to dismiss or stay proceedings which are oppressive, vexatious or an abuse of process and the rationale for the exercise of the power to stay is the avoidance of injustice between parties in the particular case. Thirdly, the mere fact that the balance of convenience favours another jurisdiction would provide a more appropriate forum does not justify the dismissal of the action or the grant of a stay. Finally, the jurisdiction to grant a stay or dismiss the action is to be exercised "with great care" or "extreme caution".

The majority in Voth discussed the following tests:

  • abandonment of the "traditional test" 9 in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada 10 and the United States 11 ;
  • "clearly inappropriate forum" test 12;
  • "clearly more appropriate forum" or "natural forum" test.

and noted that on this issue there was no international uniformity 13:

It has been argued that the Spiliada approach has been adopted not only in the United Kingdom but elsewhere and that for this reason we should embrace it. No doubt, if Spiliada were to enunciate a principle which commanded general acceptance among other countries, it would obviously be desirable in the interests of international comity that this Court, in common with the courts of other countries, should adopt a common approach. However, we are not persuaded that there exists any real international consensus favouring a particular solution to the question. Nor are we persuaded that any consensus exists among countries of the common law world.

The decision of the US Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno 14 adopts a test which is closer to the "clearly inappropriate forum" test, and though the plaintiff's choice of forum should be rarely disturbed, this is not the end of the matter:

When an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear the case, and when trial in the chosen forum would 'establish...oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant...out of all proportion to [a] plaintiff's convenience', or when the 'chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems,' the court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, dismiss the case, Koster (1947) 330 US at 524.

However, the High Court in Voth noted that questions considered by the US Supreme Court such as congested lists and lack of judicial resources are not matters which are persuasive for Australian courts 15.

The High Court of Australia in Voth provided guidance on the approach to be taken by courts in considering this issue 16:

...in the ordinary case, counsel should be able to furnish the primary judge with any necessary assistance by a short, written (preferably agreed) summary identification of relevant connecting factors and by oral submissions measured in minutes rather than hours...it will be unnecessary for the primary judge to do more than briefly indicate that, having examined the material in evidence and having taken account of the competing written and oral submissions, he or she is of the view that the proceedings should or should not be stayed on forum non conveniens (ie "clearly inappropriate forum") grounds.

EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION CLAUSES

Recent decisions by judges in the Supreme Court of New South Wales deal with two aspects of exclusive jurisdiction clauses:

  • forum non conveniens;
  • discretion.

The cases are Akai Pty Ltd v The People's Insurance Company Limited 17 and Gem Plastics Pty Ltd & Anor v Satrex Maritime (Pty) Ltd t/as South African Express Line & Ors 18.

In the Akai Case the relevant term was as follows:

Governing Law

This policy shall be governed by the laws of England. Any dispute arising from this policy shall be referred to the Courts of England.

Akai sued the insurer, who then applied for a stay of the proceedings in New South Wales relying on the governing law clause. The chief judge of the Commercial Division granted the application until further order of the Court or until final determination of the proceedings in the English Court.

The decision then went on appeal to the New South Wales Court of Appeal which found that the clause was an express statement in general of the parties' intention that the policy of insurance should be governed by English law which also determined that law to be the proper law of the contract.

Sheller JA said:

In accordance with well established principle, the express statement...of the parties' intention that the policy of insurance should be governed by English law determined that law to be the proper law of the contract. In Vita Food Products v Unus Shipping Co [1939] AC 277 Lord Wright, giving the opinion of the Privy Council, said at 289-90:

"It is now well settled that by English law (and the law of Nova Scotia is the same) the proper law of the contract is the law 'which the parties intended to apply'. That intention is objectively ascertained, and, if not expressed, will be presumed from the terms of the contract and the reklevant surrounding circumstances. ...where the English rule that intention is the test applies, and where there is an express statement by the parties of their intention to select the law of the contract, it is difficult to see what qualifications are possible, provided the intention expressed is bona fide and legal, and provided there is no reason for avoiding the choice on, the ground of public policy.

Parties are free to choose the law by which a transaction is to be governed subject to a qualification that there must be no reason for avoiding their choice on the grounds of public policy; Augustus v Permanent Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd (1971) 124 CLR 245at 252 and 260 per Walsh J, with whose judgment the other four members of the High Court concurred. Vita Food Products v Unus Shipping Company was cited with approval. In Bonython v Commonwealth of Australia [1951] AC 201 at 219 Lord Simmonds defined the proper law of the contract as "the system of law by reference to which the contract was made or that with which the transaction had its closest and most real connection". In Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50 at 61 Lord Diplock pointed out that the "or" in this pithy definition of the "proper law" of the contract was disjunctive. In speaking of a policy which contained no express provision choosing English law as the proper law of the contract, Lord Diplock at 62 went on to say

"...nevertheless its provisions taken as a whole, in my opinion, by necessary implication point ineluctably to the conclusion that the intention of the parties was that their mutual rights and obligations under it should be determined in accordance with the English law of marine insurance."

In Gem Plastics the jurisdiction clause stated:

This insurance is subject to South African jurisdiction.

and in addition, the insurance contract was made in South Africa and incorporated Institute cargo Clauses (A) which are expressed to be subject to English law and practice.

Rolfe J 19 considered the decisions in S&W Berisford PLC v New Hampshire Insurance Co 20 which was followed in TNT Shipping & Development Ltd v QBE insurance Ltd 21. In S&W Berisford the clause stated:

This insurance is subject to English jurisdiction

and Hobhouse J 22 said:

An exclusive jurisdiction clause is one which imposes a contractual obligation on one or more parties to litigate in the stated jurisdiction. The present clause if creating an obligation would create a mutual obligation. (It is of course possible for such clauses to impose such an obligation on only one of the contracting parties.)

PROPER LAW OF THE CONTRACT

The judgments of the appeal judges in Akai also considered the question of the proper law of the contract 23.

In Akai, Sheller J referred to Nygh Conflict of Laws in Australia 24 which contains the proposition that if the clause expressly states:

that 'all disputes shall be submitted to the Courts of country X', there is little room for argument.

but notes that by the time of publishing the fifth edition of the same text 25 this view has been modified in relation to choice of law in arbitration clauses.

Kirby P also gave his minority judgment on the same matter, and said that the choice of forum clause was not always a clear specification of the applicable law.

Shortly after the decision of the Court of Appeal a similar question arose in Gem Plastics, where Rolfe J cited the decision of Austrian Lloyd Steamship Co v Gresham Life Assurance Society 26 in which a clause referred to the Courts of Budapest, but noted that Roma LJ held that the clause should not be construed as exclusive so as to prevent an action being brought in England, as the word "exclusive" did not appear.

DISCRETIONARY CONSIDERATIONS

In two recent decisions, the Supreme Court of NSW has considered discretionary issues in determining that despite a jurisdiction clause, the dispute should be dealt with by the court, Gem Plastics 27 where Rolfe J said:

Even if it is correct that the clause provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the South African Courts this does not preclude this Court, if the other requirements are satisfied, from deciding that the proceedings should go forward in it in the exercise of the discretion: Huddart Parker Ltd v The Ship Mill Hill (1950) 81 CLR 502; Oceanic Sun Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 259, Leigh-Marden Pty Ltd v PRC Inc (1993) 44 FCR 88 and TNT. However, it is a matter to be taken into account in determining how the discretion should be exercised. ...The test to be applied, once the jurisdiction nexus is established, is now stated authoritatively for Australian Courts by the decision of the High Court in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 539.

The question of potential overseas witnesses was considered in CE Heath Underwriting & Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd v Barden 28.

In Gem Plastics Rolfe J 29 followed the decision of the High Court of Asutralia in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd & Anor 30 which held that a defendant must persuade the Court that it is a clearly inappropriate forum for the determination of the dispute. The majority in Voth, Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ said 31 :

Although this judgment, like the English cases, reflects a "more appropriate forum" test rather than a "clearly inappropriate forum" test, application to set aside service on inappropriate forum grounds, as well as applications for leave to serve process outside the jurisdiction, must be governed by the same principles as apply to applications for a stay on inappropriate forum grounds.

Rolfe J went on to discuss 32 the discretionary matters which favoured the plaintiff so that he was able to conclude that New South Wales was not a clearly inappropriate forum. These matters included:

  • the goods were transhipped into New South Wales;
  • the goods were damaged in New South Wales;
  • the plaintiff had commenced recovery proceedings in New South Wales;
  • a number of defendants had already entered appearances and submitted to the jurisdiction of the NSW Supreme Court;
  • a stay of the NSW proceedings against the first defendant would lead to a fragmentation of the proceedings;
  • it was clearly inappropriate that similar issues should be litigated in two different Courts in two different proceedings held in New South Wales and in South Africa as this would involve a duplication of litigation, which could not be justified;

and reference was made to the non-exhaustive list in The Eleftheria 33 which nevertheless favoured a determination of the proceedings in NSW 34.

EFFECT OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS ACT

In relation to an issue peculiar to Australia, the decision in Akai 35 also examined the operation of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) and its effect on exclusive jurisdiction clauses. However, that discussion is not relevant to contracts to which the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Cth) applies by virtue of section 9 of the Insurance Contracts Act which excludes policies of marine insurance from its ambit.

However, there are categories of insurance for which cover is given under a "marine policy", but which do not come within the strict and limited definition of "marine insurance" within the meaning of sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Marine Insurance Act 1909. In general a marine insurance policy relates to sea voyages and losses on inland waters and includes any land risk which is incidental to the sea voyage.

In other words, a dispute concerning loss or damage to goods insured under a marine policy but carried solely by air or inland transit without a component of sea carriage will be subject to the Insurance Contracts Act 1984.

The judgment of Sheller J also contains a discussion about the applicability of the Insurance Act 1902 (NSW):

A New South Wales statute does not normally apply to a contract unless the proper law of the contract is the law of New South Wales or unless it is an overriding statute in the sense that it must be applied regardless of the normal rules of the conflict of laws; Dicey & Morris 11th Ed, at 1170; Mynott v Barnard (1939) 62 CLR 68 at 79.

Sheller J dealt with this issue as follows 36 :

The weight that the Court should attach to a clause referring disputes arising under the contract to a foreign Court was considered by Beazley J in Leigh - Mardon Pty Limited v PRC Inc (1993) 44 FCR 88. Her Honour referred to The Eleftheria [1970] P 94 in which Brandan J, as he then was, said at 99-100 that where plaintiffs sue in England in Breach of an agreement to refer disputes to a foreign Court, and the defendants apply for a stay, the English Court, assuming the claim to be otherwise within its jurisdiction, is not bound to grant a stay but has a discretion whether to do so or not. The discretion should be exercised by granting a stay unless strong cause for not doing so is shown. The burden of proving such strong cause is on the plaintiff. In exercising its discretion, the Court should take into account all the circumstances of a particular case. His Lordship then identified particular matters which might, in an appropriate case, be taken into account in the exercise of discretion. At 103 his Lordship said:

"I think that it is essential that the Court should give full weight to the prima facie desirability of holding the plaintiffs to their agreement. In this connection I think that the Court must be careful not just to play lip service to the principal involved, and then fail to give effect to it because of a mere balance of convenience."

Beazley J referred also the judgment of Lord Brandan (Brandan LJ) in The El Amria [1981] 2 Lloyds Rep 119 at 123-4 where his Lordship again stated the principal. At 95 her Honour said that this approach had been consistently applied by the Court. Her Honour reviewed the cases, not only in the United Kingdom and Australia but the United States where in The Bremen v Zapata Offshore Co 407 US 1 (1972) at 15 Chief Justice Burger said: " ... in the light of present day commercial realities and expanding international trade we conclude that the forum clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside." In Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fahey (1988) 165 CLR 197 the Court held that a condition that the Courts of Greece should have exclusive jurisdiction in any action against the shipowner did not form part of the contract. However, at 224, Brennan J said that where the parties to a contract agreed that the Courts of a foreign country shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide disputes arising under the contract or out of its performance, the Courts of this country regard that agreement as a submission to such disputes to arbitration and will, in the absence of count availing reasons, stay proceedings brought here to decide those disputes: Huddart Parker Limited v The Ship "Mill Hill" (1950) 81 CLR 502 at 508-9; Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes v Wilson (1954) 94 CLR 577 at 582, 585 and 589-591. At 230 his Honour left open the question whether, where there was an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the contract, there was any reason why the guidelines effecting the exercise of the Court's discretion which the English Court of Appeal laid down in the El Amria should not be adopted in Australia ...

REFERENCE TO ARBITRATION

In the Akai Case Sheller J said 37 :

If a dispute resolution clause expressly states that all disputes should be submitted to the Courts of a particular country, that gives rise to a strong, though not conclusive inference that the law of that country is the proper law of the contract.

Sheller J then discussed a number of decisions 38, and made the following comment:

I have engaged in this rather lengthy analysis in order to emphasise that a dispute resolution clause which provides that all disputes be submitted to the Courts of a particular place is not necessarily decisive in determining the proper law of the contract. However, it raises a strong inference that the parties intended that the law of that place should govern.

It is for this reason that a clause drafted in an agreement should contain a clear statement of a number of elements:

  • Governing law;
  • Which Courts are to be approached;
  • Which rules are to apply to dispute resolution.

A reference to arbitration has also recently been the subject of judicial review in England in Egon Oldendorff v Libera Corporation 39 where the clause was as follows:

Any dispute arising under the charter to be referred to arbitration in London ...

In this case the defendants argued that Japan was a more appropriate forum for determination of the dispute between them. This case was a little clouded because there was also a question about applicable law and jurisdiction. However, the Court held that on the issue of the appropriate forum, a putative arbitration clause was a potentially significant factor where parties were in dispute. At the end of the day, the matter appears to have been decided on the basis of the Court exercising its discretion in deciding that the English Court was the more appropriate forum for the resolution of the disputes.

The most recent US decision on an arbitration clause was concerned with the US Cogsa rather than marine insurance, Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros SSA v MV Sky Reefer 40 in which the US Supreme Court held that foreign arbitration clauses are enforceable.

Jacobs, in International Commercial Arbitration in Australia 41, identifies the selection of the situs of an arbitration by express choice as one of the means of adopting arbitration.


1

(1988) 165 CLR 197.

2

[1990] 171 CLR 538, on appeal from the Supreme Court of NSW (1989) 15 NSWLR 513, reversed.

3

(1994) 33 NSWLR 414 per Gleeson CJ at 420.

4

[1987] AC 460.

5

(1988) 165 CLR at 241, cited by the majority in Voth [1990] 171 CLR at 550.

6

[1990] 171 CLR at 552.

7

(1908) 6 CLR 194.

8

[1990] 171 CLR at 554.

9

[1990] 171 CLR at 556,7.

10

[1990] 171 CLR at 560 referring to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Antares Shipping v The Ship "Capricorn" [1977] 2 SCR 422 at 448, 451-454.

11

Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno (1981) 454 US 235 at 241.

12

[1990] 171 CLR at 557.

13

[1990] 171 CLR 560.

14

Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno (1981) 454 US 235 at 241.

15

[1990] 171 CLR at 561.

16

[1990] 171 CLR at 565.

17

Unreported: NSW Court of Appeal, Kirby P; Meagher JA; Sheller JA, 28 April 1995.

18

Unreported: Supreme Court of NSW, Rolfe J, 9 June 1995.

19

Decision of 9 June 1995, at p5.

20

[1990] 1 Lloyds Rep 454.

21

Unreported: Supreme Court of NSW, Hunter J, 7 November 1994.

22

[1990] 1 Lloyds Rep at 457.

23

Sheller and Meagher JA at 2, Kirby P at 4ff.

24

First edition, 1968 at p297.

25

see p162.

26

[1903] 1 KB 249.

27

Unreported 9 June 1995 at 20.

28

Unreported: Supreme Court of NSW, Rolfe J, 19 October 1994 at 57 et seq.

29

p21.

30

(1990) 171 CLR 539.

31

p563.

32

Unreported 31 August 1995 at p10 et seq.

33

[1980] P 94 at 99.

34

Unreported, 31 August 1995 at 13, 14.

35

per Sheller JA at 2.

36

Akai, op cit, p16.

37

at p3

38

Compagnie d'Armement MAritime SA v Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA [1971] AC 572, Tzortzis v Monark Line A/B [1968] 1 WLR 406.

39

[1995] 2 Lloyds Rep 64.

40

1995 WL 360200 (US).

41

Law Book Co, para 23-290.